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Act of State and Political Question Doctrines:
Judicial Prudence or Abdication?
Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo,
577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978)
For the fifty-eighth time since 1971,1 Occidental of Umm al
Qaywayn, Inc. instituted suit in an attempt to recoup a portion of
the one hundred million dollar deficit suffered as a result of the loss
of their Persian Gulf oil concession. This particular suit was brought
against, inter alia, an American corporation currently in possession of
the disputed concession area. The claim was for conversion and was
based on two separate diversity actions and an in rem action in admi-
ralty. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
diversity actions, holding that the "act of state doctrine" prevented
the court from reaching the merits, and further, that the Hicken-
looper Amendment 2 did not prevent the abstention. The lower court
dismissed the admiralty action by ruling that the conversion, if it took
place, happened at the site of the well-head and not on the ocean.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
held, dismissed in part, reversed in part: The conversion claim pre-
sented is non-justiciable as it contains a political question.
The significance of the Court of Appeals' decision is heightened
by its grant of an injunction against all pending and further litigation
in state and federal courts. The injunction was stayed pending Su-
preme Court disposition. 3 Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn (Occiden-
tal) filed its petition for a writ of certiorari on December 6, 1978.
4
1. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 396 F. Supp.
461, 464 (W.D. La. 1975), dismissed in part, rev'd in part sub non. Occidental of
Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo, Etc., 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978).
The district court opinion hereinafter will be cited as Cities Serv. Oil. The court of
appeals case hereinafter will be cited as A Certain Cargo.
2. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2 ) (Supp. V 1975).
3. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d at 1205. Federal courts are usually precluded
from enjoining pending state action. Because of the political question, however, the
court stated, "we deem it necessary to enjoin state proceedings in order to effectuate
our judgment that the issue is one committed to the executive. Such an injunction
also is necessary to aid the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to finally resolve the
question of the existence of a political question." Id. at 1205-1206 n.18.
4. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A
Certain Cargo, No. 78-910, -U.S.- (1978).
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The full facts of this case, although bizarre, are important, as
they illustrate a problem faced by many American corporations that
participate in transnational trade. It is the problem of the American
business trapped by shifting territorial claims of foreign sovereigns.
The Trucial Sheikdoms, by treaty, were under the protectorate
of Great Britain until November 30, 1971. During this time, Britain
had control of the Sheikdoms' international intercourse, defense, and
internal relations. Important to this case are two of the Sheikdoms:
Umm al Qaywayn (Umm) and Sharjah. 5  On November 18, 1969,
plaintiff obtained from the Sheik of Umm al Qaywayn a concession
granting it the exclusive right to explore and extract oil underlying
the territorial and offshore waters of Umm. The boundaries of this
concession conformed to the treaty Umm had entered into with Shar-
jah under British auspices in 1964. The plan was approved by the
British Foreign Office as required under the treaty. On December
29, 1969, Sharjah granted Buttes Gas and Oil Company a similar con-
cession in Sharjah's territorial waters; this plan was also approved by
the British. Occidental and Buttes worked in cooperation, exchanging
information from seismic tests in their respective areas, until March
1970. At this time, Occidental's exploratory tests showed the exis-
tence of large amounts of oil within its concession area about nine
miles off the island of Abu Musa. The island of Abu Musa and its
surrounding waters are the center of this suit's dispute.
Occidental contends that Buttes induced Sharjah to unilaterally
extend its own territorial sea from the "accepted" three miles to
twelve miles, thus including the Abu Musa waters. On April 7, 1970,
Sharjah and Buttes executed an amendment to their original conces-
sion contract to include the extended area. This amendment was
made pursuant to an unpublished Sharjah decree backdated to Sep-
tember 10, 1969. The backdated fraudulent territorial water decree 6
and subsequent concession amendments were not accepted by the
British Foreign Office, which also rejected Buttes' request to com-
5. Today both nations, together with the other Trucial Skeikdoms, comprise the
United Arab Emirates.
6. The allegation was made by the plaintiff in Cities Serv. Oil, 396 F. Supp. at
465. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, which
was affirmed on appeal. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d at 1196. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 56,
in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment it is deemed that all facts
alleged by the plaintiff are true. Moreover, this fact was established by the district
court in the earlier antitrust suit of Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil
Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 111 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
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mence drilling in the area contained in Occidental's concession. Ad-
ding to the confusion, the nearby country of Iran on May 28, 1970,
informed Occidental that it should desist from drilling in the area
because it claimed that Abu Musa was an Iranian possession and was
within the Iranian twelve-mile territorial sea. At this point, Great Bri-
tain suspended all drilling in the area. Plaintiff alleges that Buttes, in
an attempt to procure the area for itself, conspired with Sharjah, in-
duced Iran to claim sovereignty, and finally, induced the British to
coerce the Sheik of Umm to terminate the lease. 7 When the British
protectorship expired in 1971 (Iran and Sharjah had reached an ac-
cord on the division of Abu Musa), Iran landed troops on the island
and patrolled its waters; Umm was unable to defend the area. Buttes
commenced drilling on the continental shelf, and, as expected, found
rich deposits of oil. In June 1973, the Sheik of Umm completely ter-
minated Occidental's concession for failure to make the rent pay-
ments.
Litigation on this set of facts reached the courts in California 8 for
the first time in 1971, when Occidental charged defendant Buttes Oil
Co. with a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 9 The district
court in that case found sufficient anticompetitive effects on United
States commerce to support jurisdiction, but it refrained from ruling
on the merits because of the "act of state doctrine." Under this doc-
trine a forum court will not question the acts of a foreign sovereign
done within that sovereign's territory. 10 The classical approach to
the doctrine was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Underhill v.
Hernandez: 1 "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the inde-
pendence of every other state, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within
its own territory." 12
Because of the act of state doctrine's applicability, the antitrust
case 13 was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The instant case was brought for conversion when
7. This was accomplished by having the British Royal Air Force buzz the home
of the Sheik by airplanes, surround his house, and threaten to exile him. It was also
stated that the Royal Navy boarded Occidental's sea-going equipment under force.
Occidental v. Buttes Gas & Oil, 331 F. Supp. at 99-101.
8. Id. at 92.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1973).
10. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
11. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
12.. Id. at 252.
13. Occidental v. Buttes Gas & Oil, 331 F. Supp. at 92.
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the oil extracted by Buttes 14 was imported into the United States.
Defendant moved for dismissal and/or summary judgment claiming
that, inter alia, "the act of state doctrine precludes inquiry into the
acts of foreign states called into question and resolution of the issues
would require adjudication of a boundary dispute between foreign na-
tions." 15 The district court observed:
Throughout this litigation defendants have treated as an unassail-
able rule of law the premise that a United States court cannot
decide a case involving the private rights of private parties to
property if the adjudication of those rights requires a collateral de-
termination of any kind with respect to boundaries. We do not
read the jurisprudence to be that all embracing.
16
Despite this statement, summary judgment was granted on act of
state grounds since "the entire fabric of the complaint is woven out of
attacks on the validity of, or questioning the reasons for, the acts of
Sharjah, Iran or Umm." 17 The Court of Appeals of the Fifth Cir-
cuit 8 upheld the District Court's granting of summary judgment on
the ground that "the question presented is political" as "it is neces-
sary to determine the sovereign ownership of the portion of the con-
tinental shelf from which the oil was extracted." 9
Although the final outcome was the same in both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals, 20 the reasoning advanced by the
latter court took a significant shift. The appellate court declined to
hear the merits, not on the familiar act of state restraint, but because
the decision involved a political question. This shift is significant in
two respects: (1) The use of the political question doctrine may reflect
a belief that the act of state doctrine is no longer a viable mechanism
by which a court may avoid adjudication of sensitive questions. As
will be discussed below in Section I, there has been a gradual erosion
14. The appellate court mistakenly states that the oil in 1974 was extracted by
Occidental. 577 F.2d at 1200. See the facts as established by the district court in
Cities Serv. Oil, 396 F. Supp. at 465, 472; see also Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at
9, Occidental v. A Certain Cargo, No. 78-910, - U.S. - (1978).
15. Cities Serv. Oil, 396 F. Supp. at 466.
16. Id. at 468.
17. Id. at 469.
18. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d at 1196.
19. Id. at 1203.
20. The district court did not reach the merits and dismissed on the basis of act
of state grounds. Cities Serv. Oil, 396 F. Supp. at 461. The court of appeals also
failed to reach the merits because of the presence of a political question. A Certain
Cargo, 577 F.2d at 1196. Although there were two different bases for dismissal, they
involved similar prudential notions of judicial self restraint.
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in the traditional act of state doctrine, creating justiciable exceptions
where the foreign state is acting in its commercial capacity; (2) The
shift to the political question doctrine may also indicate an important
overall trend for international disputes by providing an alternative
means for the court to avoid addressing the merits of such disputes.
This is particularly true if the doctrine is accepted outside the tortious
conversion area. The Court's use of the political question doctrine
will be discussed in Section II.
I. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMERCIAL EXCEPTION
A. Developments Leading to Sabbatino
As mentioned above, the progenitor of the act of state doctrine is
Underhill v. Hernandez.2 1 The Court refused to examine the false
imprisonment charges brought by an American citizen against a Ven-
ezuelan revolutionary whose government subsequently was recog-
nized by the United States. At the Second Circuit level, the court
stated that in "considerations of comity, and of the highest expe-
diency," 22 it would refuse to sit in judgment on the acts of a
sovereign done within its own territory. It should be noted that the
Supreme Court rather summarily assented to the lower court's
reasoning and with the exception of the opening paragraphs and one
short passage, dealt primarily with the problems of political revolt,
warfare, and individual liability.
23
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 24 was the next sig-
nificant link and was the first time that the Court had to grapple with
the dual components of the act of state doctrine and antitrust
infringements. The plaintiff's interest began with a Mr. McConnel,
who started a banana plantation and railroad in Panama; the defen-
dant banana company threatened that he must either merge with the
defendant's Latin American operations or leave the area. Induced by
the defendant, an American corporation, the Governor of Panama rec-
ommended that Costa Rica administer the, territory through which
the McConnel railroad was to pass. While Costa Rica interfered with
21. 168 U.S. 250.
22. 65 F. 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1895).
23. 168 U.S. 250.
24. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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McConnel's operations, Panama revolted and became independent of
Costa Rica. The plaintiff, an American corporation which bought
McConnel's plantation, alleged that the defendant instigated a Costa
Rican invasion and confiscation of the plantation and railroad. Plaintiff
charged the defendant with violation of the Sherman Act 25 and sued
to enjoin the defendant's monopolization and restraint of the importa-
tion of bananas into the United States. The Supreme Court dismissed
the case in a two-pronged ratiocination. First, the Court laid down a
strict territorial limit to the Sherman Act, stating that the alleged
actions must have taken place within the United States.2 6  The sec-
ond prong asserted a conflict of laws principle: the refusal of one state
to interfere with the sovereign acts of another state done within its
own territory.
27
The first part of the holding is no longer valid, 28 as was recently
reiterated in Wells Fargo v. Wells Fargo Express Company. 29  In
discussing extraterritoriality, the court stated that it "should be
gauged not so much by the locus of the activity sought to be reached
• . . as by the nature of its effect on that commerce which Congress
may regulate. . . . [A]lthough foreign activities must of course have
some effect on United States' foreign commerce before they can be
reached we disagree with the district court's requirement that the
effect must be substantial." 30 The second part of the holding of
American Banana has also been limited, as the act of state doctrine is
no longer found to totally preclude judicial intervention in interna-
tional cases alleging breach of the antitrust laws. "IT]he courts have
25. Id. at 353.
26. Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority, stated:
The foregoing considerations would lead in case of doubt to a construction
of any statute as intended to be confined in its operations and effect to the
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate
power .... We think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in
Panama or Costa Rica is not within the scope of the statute so far as the
present suit is concerned. Id. at 357.
27. The Court asserted that to hear this action "would be an interference with
the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other
state concerned justly might resent." Id. at 356.
28. Erosion of this concept can be seen in United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106, 134 (1911); United States v. Pacific & A. Ry. & Nay. Co., 228
U.S. 87, 105-06 (1913); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917); United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1951); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Car-
bon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-05 (1962). See also Victor, Multinational Corpora-
tions-Antitrust Extraterritoriality and the Prospect of Immunity, 8 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 11 (1973); Comment, 21 J. PUB. L. 151 (1972).
29. 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
30. Id. at 428.
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sought to expand the scope of the application of the Sherman Act by
distinguishing sovereign acts from those of a private party." 31 Two
facets of the private party exception have emerged. The first one is
the compulsion doctrine.3 2 Antitrust penalties will not be imposed
on an American corporation operating overseas for violation of the
Sherman Act if the alleged violation was done pursuant to direct or-
ders of a foreign sovereign.3 3 The second facet is that mere ap-
proval, toleration, or acknowledgment by a foreign sovereign will not
prevent application of the antitrust regulations to an American corpo-
ration.
3 4
Much confusion about the applicability of the act of state doc-
trine has resulted from these variations and limitations. As illustrated
by Occidental v. A Certain Cargo, particular problems arise when
the private American defendant has induced the sovereign to act in a
manner contrary to American antitrust regulations. It has been ar-
gued that courts should not, through a separation of powers device,
35
shield private parties from antitrust liability when they seek to hide
behind foreign law.36 Indeed, several courts have been unwilling to
permit a defense based on alleged governmental actions which are
shown to have been arranged by the defendant in order to further its
own monopolistic schemes.
In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,37 the Court found that a
violation of the antitrust laws occurred where as a part of an anticom-
petitive conspiracy, the defendant induced the government of Mexico
to pass discriminatory legislation aimed at the defendant's American
competitors. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's act of state
31. 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 311, 313 (1977).
32. K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 82 (1958);
Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy and International Buying Cooperation, 84 YALE
L. J. 268 (1974). Anticompetitive practices compelled by foreign nations are not re-
straints of commerce as commerce is understood in the Sherman Act, because refusal
to comply would put an end to commerce.
33. International Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291
(D. Del. 1970). But see id. at 1297 n.14, "[tihe effect of showing the order to be
induced is to establish a conspiracy, which would bring the present case within Sisal
Sales. "
34. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v.
Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Center, Inc., [19631 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), modified, [1965] Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
35. Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 805 (1964).
36. Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and Foreign Sovereignty, 49 VA. L. REv. 925
(1963).
37. 264 U.S. 268 (1927).
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defense which was based on the American Banana opinion. The
Court held that a conspiracy to monopolize, formed in the United
States for purposes of securing monopoly control over certain raw
material shipments to the United States, would not be immunized
simply because one element of the conspiracy involved action taken
by foreign officials. 38 In 1962, the Supreme Court reiterated this
reasoning in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide,39 where the
Court was careful to point out that although the Canadian govern-
ment permitted the defendant's anticompetitive conduct, the dis-
puted act was not that of the Canadian government itself. Nor was
the private defendant's action equivalent to the act of a sovereign.
40
It has been stated that implicit in these Supreme Court decisions "is
the conclusion that the act of state doctrine does not apply if the
foreign governmental officials were mere pawns in a private conspi-
racy, rather than a major moving force behind the scheme. '" 4 1 Thus,
in a fact situation analogous to American Banana, the Court shifted
the focus to the private defendant's actions, thereby negating the
need to invalidate the actions of a foreign sovereign.
The many strands of the act of state doctrine were brought to-
gether by the Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino.42 In this case, Banco Nacional, the plaintiff, a financial agent
of the Cuban government, filed suit for conversion against Farr,
Whitlock & Co., a commodity broker, for the wrongful taking of
sugar and bills of lading. The defendant insisted that the sugar did
not belong to Cuba, but to the sugar company. The company had
incorporated in Cuba but the majority of stock belonged to American
citizens. It was alleged that the expropriation by Cuba did not vest
proper title in that government, for the taking was contrary to inter-
national law. The Supreme Court invoked the act of state doctrine
and upheld the validity of the expropriation. The Court stated that
Cuba had acted in its sovereign capacity and American courts would
refrain from sitting in judgment on this action. Explicit in the deci-
sion was the judicial fear that the Court's interference would un-
38. Davidow, supra note 32; Comment, supra note 28.
39. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
40. Id. In this case the plaintiff asserted that the defendant conspired to restrain
trade and monopolize commerce in vanadium. Defendant allegedly induced a war-
time purchasing agent of the Canadian government to eliminate plaintiff from the
Canadian market.
41. Davidow, supra note 32, at 283.
42. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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necessarily imperil the political branches' ability to conduct foreign
relations. 43  On behalf of the majority, Justice Harlan stated:
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign govern-
ment, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in
the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the
taking violates customary international law.44
Three explanations for the doctrine, as formulated and applied by
American courts, were expounded:4 5 (1) respect for the sovereign's
right of self government, within its own territory; (2) concern that
title to property in international commerce would be rendered less
stable by judicial interference in this area; and (3) concern with judi-
cial encroachment on foreign relations matters which are the respon-
sibility of the executive branch.
The Sabbatino court did not completely rule against judicial
examination of sovereign acts. The Court recognized that it had an
obligation to the litigants to do justice and to foster the rule of law in
the international arena. 4 6 The Court set up a balancing approach,
stating that "the greater the degree of ... consensus concerning a
particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it . . . . [Tlhe less important
the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker
the justifications for exclusivity in the political branches." 4 7  The
majority opinion explicitly rejected "laying down or reaffirming an in-
flexible and all-encompassing rule. " 48  The holding in this case has
given lower federal courts much difficulty. The district court in Occi-
dental v. Buttes 49 understood Sabbatino to be a reaffirmation of the
classic act of state doctrine of Underhill and American Banana. In
dismissing the case, the California district court utilized "the holding
43. The Constitution does not expressly call for the act of state doctrine; rather it
arises from the constitutional division of power into three separate branches. Indeed,
the doctrine may be characterized as a judicial creation, an "assertion of the
judiciary's own power under the Constitution." Henkin, supra note 35, at 815. Ac-
cording to Professor Bickel, the court's self limitation practice is its most preservative
virtue. See generally, A. BiCKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
44. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
45. See 14 HARV. INT'L L. J. 131 (1973).
46. The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 58, 273 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1975 Supreme Court Term].
47. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
48. Id.
49. 331 F. Supp. at 92.
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of American Banana that has endured .... [T]he act of state doc-
trine bars a claim for antitrust injury flowing from sovereign acts
allegedly induced and procured by the defendant."5 0 This interpreta-
tion is relatively unique, as Sabbatino subsequently has been gener-
ally limited to the narrow fact situation of expropriation."' There was
a legislative attempt to confine the holding even further through the
enactment of the Hickenlooper Amendment. 52 The courts, in turn,
have interpreted the Hickenlooper Amendment to apply only when
the nationalized property was taken contrary to international law,
and, additionally, when the property or its traceable proceeds have
come within American borders.53
The next significant Supreme Court decision dealing with the act
of state doctrine came in 1972, in First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba (Citibank).5 4  Here the Court allowed a coun-
terclaim to be filed against a Cuban bank by an American bank for
damages occasioned when the American institution's property was ex-
propriated. It should be noted that the counterclaim did not exceed
the sovereign's original claim. The Court's growing lack of consensus
on the act of state doctrine was very evident in Citibank. The plural-
ity opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, with the concurrence of
Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, held that this area demanded
deference by the judicial branch to the political branches, 5 and that
this requirement arose from the separation of powers aspect of
American government and from the need to "effectuate general no-
tions of comity among nations." 5 6  In finding that the act of state
doctrine was not a bar to the counterclaim, Justice Rehnquist recog-
nized the propriety of the conduct taken by the State Department on
50. Id. at 110.
51. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 592 (9th Cir.
1976); Leigh and Sandier, Dunhill: Toward a Reconstruction of Sabbatino, 16 VA. J.
INT'L L. 685 (1976); 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 311 (1977). See also Falk, The Complexity of
Sabbatino, 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 935 (1964).
52. 22 U.S.C. § 23 7 0(e)(2 ) (Supp. V 1975), provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States
shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a
determination of the merits giving effect to the principles of international
law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted
by any party including a foreign state . . . based upon (or traced through)
a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state
in violation of the principles of international law.
53. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 765.
56. Id. at 762.
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behalf of the Executive branch in advising the Court that the act of
state doctrine need not be applied to the instant situation. 5 7 In dis-
missing the counterclaim, Douglas' concurrence emphasized equitable
notions, thereby avoiding the act of state doctrine; 58 Justice Powell
went as far as to say that perhaps Sabbatino and the act of state
doctrine were being interpreted too broadly. 59 The doctrine should
not be construed in such a manner as to force the court to "eschew
acting in all cases in which the underlying issue is the validity of
expropriation under customary international law." 60
It was within this framework that Occidental v. Buttes Oil Co.
6 1
and the district court opinion in Occidental v. A Certain Cargo 62
were rendered. Both these cases were summarily dismissed on act of
state grounds, since the respective courts felt the resolution of the
dispute would necessarily involve deciding a territorial dispute among
foreign nations. The courts in both instances took the view that they
were "precluded from piercing the veil of sovereign action by the 'act
of state doctrine,' " 63which, despite some uncertainty from the Su-
preme Court, they understood to be a viable judicial tool.
B. The Dunhill Environment
The uncertainty over the proper role of the act of state doctrine
was conspicuously brought to the fore in Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.64  Cuba had expropriated the businesses,
and assets of its five leading cigar manufacturers and appointed "in-
terventors" to run the businesses. Business went on as usual after the
confiscation, with the interventors continuing to ship cigars to the
American importers. The United States firms still sent payments to
Cuba, including payment for some tobacco which had been shipped
before the expropriation. The former owners of the seized businesses
57. Id. at 764. This exception to the act of state doctrine is commonly called the
"Bernstein exception." Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
Stoomvaat-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). The "Bernstein exception" has
apparently been rejected as only three justices in Citibank utilized the "exception"
and six justices rejected its application. Additionally, as one commentator has noted,
the letter written by the State Department in Dunhill was not taken as a "binding
statement, but as a guide to analyze the impact of the case on foreign policy." 1975
Supreme Court Term, supra note 46, at 269 n.21.
58. First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 770-73 (Douglas, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 774 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 775.
61. 331 F. Supp. 92.
62. 396 F. Supp. 461.
63. 577 F.2d at 1200.
64. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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brought suit against United States importers in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York to recover the
money paid to the interventors. The interventors brought a collateral
action to intervene, claiming that they were the rightful owners of all
money paid or still owed on all shipments of cigars. The District
Court ruled that the former owners were entitled to the money.due
before the expropriation, and the interventors were due all payments
for tobacco shipped after the confiscation. The District Court rejected
the interventors' arguments that the refusal to repay the former own-
ers was an act of state; the Second Circuit reversed, 65 stating that
such a refusal was indeed an act of state.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Cuban inter-
ventors had not sufficiently established that they were exercising
sovereign power and thus failed to prove an act of state. 66  Despite
this narrow holding, very broad implications for the future of the act
of state doctrine were contained in the opinion. A plurality of four
justices clearly felt that the act of state doctrine should be limited to a
nation's sovereign acts, state qua state, and that immunity should not
be granted to purely commercial acts of a foreign government. 67 Jus-
tice White articulated this view. He set forth substantial precedent
for a commercial versus governmental distinction recognized in
American law. He then analogized this area to the similar doctrine of
restrictive sovereign immunity, which refuses to extend immunity in a
suit to a state which is acting as an entrepreneur.6 8  Quoting from
65. 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973).
66. 425 U.S. at 694-95. The Court found that "the only evidence of an act of state
other than the act of non-payment by the interventors was 'statement by counsel for
the interventors, during trial, that the Cuban Government and the interventors de-
nied liability and had refused to make repayment."' Id. at 694.
67. Id. at 695-706.
68. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d. 354 (2d Cir. 1964). This case involved an alleged breach of a ship-
ping contract by a Spanish government agency engaged in shipping wheat. The court
took note of "the increasing entry of governments into what had previously been
regarded as private pursuits." Id. at 357. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
applied a:
[riestrictive theory of sovereign immunity [in order] . . to try to accommo-
date the interest of individuals doing business with foreign governments in
having their legal rights determined by the courts, with the interests of
foreign governments in being free to perform certain political acts without
undergoing the embarrassment or hinderance of defending the propriety of
such acts before foreign courts. Id. at 360.
See Baker, Antitrust Remedies Against Government Inspired Boycotts, Shortages,
and Squeezes, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 911 (1976). See also Timberg, Sovereign Immunity
and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEX.
L. REV. 1 (1976).
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Ohio v. Helvering,69 the plurality opinion noted that, "[w]hen a state
enters the marketplace seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi
sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader."
Justice White concluded that the compelling justification for narrow-
ing the scope of sovereign immunity is also present and persuasive in
limiting the act of state doctrine:
Participation by foreign sovereigns in the international commercial
market has increased substantially in recent years. . . The poten-
tial injury to private businessmen-and ultimately to international
trade itself-from a system in which some of the participants in
the international market are not subject to the rule of law has
therefore increased correspondingly.
70
Adding more uncertainty to the status of the act of state doctrine
is the fact that the Supreme Court in Dunhill specifically asked for
argument on whether its holding in Sabbatino should be reconsid-
ered, 71 leading one to believe that the Court was unsure of the con-
tinued validity of the act of state doctrine. The Court unfortunately
failed to reach the question, thereby perpetuating the ambiguous na-
ture of the doctrine.
In analyzing the status of the act of state doctrine following
Dunhill, even the most restrictive reading of the case must recognize
the added burden of proof the party invoking the doctrine must carry
in governmental-commercial activities. 72 Additional impetus for re-
stricting the scope of the act of state doctrine has come from the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 73 which embodies the dis-
tinction between public acts and private or commercial acts. The
House Committee on the Judiciary, Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in
Suits Against Foreign States, 74 warned that the restrictive doctrine of
sovereign immunity could be undercut if courts refused to adopt a
similarly restrictive view of the act of state doctrine. In so doing, the
Committee endorsed the position taken by the State and Justice De-
partments in their amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in
Dunhill; 75 these departments also urged the Court to limit the scope
69. 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934).
70. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703.
71. Memorandum Decision, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
422 U.S. 1005 (1975).
72. See 1975 Supreme Court Term, supra note 46.
73. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
74. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 n.1 (1976).
75. See Timberg, supra note 68.
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of the act of state doctrine to conform to the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity. As stated by Monroe Leigh, 76 legal advisor to
the State Department, the department was strongly opposed to per-
mitting sovereign immunity to re-enter through the back door, under
the guise of the act of state doctrine. Additionally, in a letter to the
Solicitor General, reprinted in Dunhill, Mr. Leigh stated, "this De-
partment's experience provides little support for a presumption that
adjudication of acts of foreign states in accordance with relevant prin-
ciples of international law would embarrass the conduct of foreign
policy." 77
The Dunhill approach-the flexible balancing of different in-
terests and the judicial examination of the nature of the questioned
foreign activity-has more recently been seen in a 1976 court of ap-
peals case, Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. &
S.A. 78  In this case, the defendant bank had conspired to restrain and
monopolize the Honduran lumber trade to a few select individuals
financed and controlled by the bank.79 The bank, pursuant to Hon-
duran law, had an "embargo" put on plaintiff's property.8 0 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the act of state doctrine did
not apply to immunize defendant's behavior. The court stated
"[w]hile we do not wish to impugn or question the nobility of a
foreign nation's motivation, we are necessarily interested in the depth
and nature of its interest."8 " The court was willing to look behind
the sovereign facade to see what motivated the state's action. It con-
cluded that there was no indication that the Honduran actions re-
flected a studied policy or "sovereign decision that Timberlane's ef-
forts should be crippled or that the trade with the United States
should be restrained." 2  "It is apparent that the [act of state] doc-
76. Leigh and Sandler, supra note 51, at 694.
77. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 710.
78. 549 F.2d 597 (1976).
79. Id. at 601.
80. Under Honduran law an 'embargo' on property is [a] court-ordered attach-
ment, registered with the Public Registry, which precludes the sale of the property
without a court order. Honduran law provides, upon embargo, that the court appoint
a judicial officer, called an 'interventor' to ensure against any diminution in value of
the property. In order to paralyze the Timberland operation . . the interventor,
since accused of being on the payroll of the Bank, [used] guards and troops . .. to
cripple and, for a time, completely shut down Timberlane's milling opeation. Id. at
604-605.
81. Id. at 607.
82. Id. at 608.
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trine does not bestow a blank-check immunity upon all conduct
blessed with some imprimatur of a foreign government."
3
Timberlane thus demonstrated the viability of the commercial
exception to the act of state doctrine. This was further reinforced by
Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,84 which showed that courts
are competent to delineate between activity which is peculiarly
sovereign and that which is commercial in nature.
In 1976, Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. 8 5 was filed. The case was dis-
missed on act of state grounds, but could also have been denied re-
view because of the presence of a political question. The plaintiff
Hunt, an oil producer in Libya, brought suit against other Libyan and
Persian Gulf Oil producers for antitrust violations. Hunt had entered
into an agreement with defendant Mobil to collectively oppose Lib-
yan and OPEC demands, and pursuant to this agreement, Hunt re-
jected certain Libyan terms. Libya retaliated by nationalizing Hunt's
holdings. Hunt alleged that the defendants induced this Libyan ac-
tion. The case was dismissed as being non-justiciable, and the court
reaffirmed what it felt was the traditional act of state doctrine, which
precluded American courts from "inquiring into the validity of the
public acts of a recognized foreign sovereign power."" 6  The court
stated that even the appellants "conceded on the oral argument of
this appeal that the nationalization of Hunt's properties was not a
purely commercial act within the Dunhill exception." 8 7 The court
placed great emphasis on the fact that the expropriation was politi-
cally motivated, and, as such, triggered a need for the foreign rela-
tions expertise which is constitutionally vested in the Executive
Branch. It even quoted Libyan president al-Qadhafi, on the occur-
rence of the confiscation, as saying, "the time has come for the U.S.
interests to be threatened earnestly and seriously in the Arab area,
regardless of the cost.""' Thus, this case also involves the most or-
thodox aspects of judicial abstention and the political question doc-
trine. This was not a contract or economic squabble, but a political
83. Id. at 606.
84. 432 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). This case involved the Brazilian govern-
ment's denial of import licenses to prevent farm-type, cropdusting planes from com-
ing into the country. The court distinguished between the activity that a business is
capable of, and the type of activity normally considered to be within a government's
power.
85. 410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 904 (1977).
86. 550 F.2d at 73, quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398.
87. 550 F.2d at 73.
88. Id.
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war, and the enemy was not one slighted corporation, but American
interests in general. The court found no validity in the plaintiff's as-
sertion that "Libya, like Hunt, was a 'victim' of the conspiracy," 8 9 for
"the action taken here is obviously only an isolated act in a continuing
and broadened confrontation between the East and West in an oil
crisis which has implications and complications far transcending those
suggested by appellants." 90
It is within this framework that the appellate decision was
reached in Occidental v. A Certain Cargo. The perimeters of the act
of state doctrine, used as a basis for dismissal in the 1975 (pre-
Dunhill) lower court decision, were no longer clearly defined. In
analyzing the factual situation presented by Occidental vis-a-vis the
act of state doctrine, the facts appear more similar to those in Timber-
lane, than in Hunt. In the instant case, there -vas no apparent politi-
cal reason to harm Occidental; Sharjah had seemingly replaced one
American corporation with another. The Sharjah relationship with
Buttes had no apparent sovereign overtones; rather, the country's ac-
tions were of a commercial nature. The lack of politics involved in the
relationship seems to lend credence to the idea that Sharjah would
not be affronted if an American court ordered an American corpora-
tion to share profits from the concession area with another American
corporation. Thus, the instant case would fall squarely within the
commercial exception. But the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Oc-
cidental upheld the district court's dismissal "on the slightly different
ground that the question presented is political." 91 This allowed the
court to ignore the Dunhill line of cases which legitimize the com-
mercial exception concept. Although the last word has not been spo-
ken on the act of state doctrine, its classical interpretation seems to
be in suspension.
OCCIDENTAL AND THE ADVENT
OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
A careful examination of the facts as established by the Court of
Appeals reveals that the date of the alleged conversion was "at the
time the interest was passed, 1969." 92 Yet Occidental possessed an
undisputed property right in the lease with Umm at that time, for
Umm and Sharjah had entered into an agreement under British aus-
pices, which defined Umm's continental shelf. It is imperative to re-
89. Id. at 78 n.14.
90. Id. at 78.
91. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d at 1198.
92. Id, at 1202.
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member that under the treaty with Great Britain, which was to be in
force until November 31, 1971, Great Britain had complete control
over the area and over all agreements made by Sharjah and Umm.
This treaty was recognized by the United States.
Umm's continental shelf extended, with the assent of Sharjah, to
the three mile territorial sea of Abu Musa.9 3 Occidental and Umm
entered into the lease for the exploration and extraction of oil in
November 1969. This was approved by the British. Sharjah and
Buttes subsequently came to a similar agreement in December 1969,
which was also approved by the British. By an unpublished, fraudu-
lently backdated, unilateral decree, Sharjah attempted to increase its
territorial waters from three miles to twelve. 94  The British were
made aware of Buttes' intention to drill in this area pursuant to the
decree extending Sharjah's territorial sea. Both the decree and
Buttes' desire to drill in Occidental's concession area were rejected
by the British. Iran's claim to Abu Musa was not made known until
May 28, 1970. An earlier claim dating from the nineteenth century
did not contain any mention of ownership of Umm's continental shelf.
Thus, the 1969 Occidental-Umm lease, giving Occidental free use of
the continental shelf, was undisputed at the time of the alleged con-
version. Although the Court of Appeals states that in order to main-
tain a successful conversion action, Occidental must establish its right
to possession at the time of the alleged conversion - 1969 -the Court
nonetheless appears to ignore the very facts which would satisfy such
a requirement. Thus, the Court's haste to discuss the political ques-
tion doctrine may have been factually unnecessary. Further, such fac-
tual inconsistencies may weaken the viability of the Court of Appeals
decision if successfully brought to the attention of the Supreme Court
on certiorari.
The political question rationale 5 advanced by the Occidental
court is a concept of judicial self-limitation, similar to the act of state
93. Id. at 1199.
94. Id.
95. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 7t n. 1 (1978).
There are generally three recognized views on political questions: (1) The classical
Marbury v. Madison interpretation, which states that unless the issue was specifically
prohibited by the text of the Constitution the court should adjudicate all cases that
come before it; (2) The prudential outlook, which holds that if the determination of
the issue would cause the court to "'compromise important principles or if it would
undermine the court's authority," the court should refrain from entertaining the suit;
(3) The functional analysis, which deals with the problem of acquiring information
necessary for deciding the merits of the case, or the need for uniformity including
respect for the other branches of government. Id. at 71-72 n.1.
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doctrine and amenable to similar criticism. As recognized in the case
of Baker v. Carr,9 the "most definitive pronouncement ' ' s by the
Supreme Court on political questions, "it is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance." 98 It is also erroneous for the Appellate Court
to manufacture a political question, thereby rendering the case non-
justiciable, because of judicial reluctance to decide a difficult case. An
examination of the facts of the controversy clearly reveals a cognizable
claim untouched by the elements which the Court believed gave rise
to a political question. The Supreme Court in Baker enunciated a test
to determine what issues contain a political question and should thus
be dismissed as non-justiciable:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an un-
usual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.9 9
Clearly, a conversion suit brought by one American national
against another does not fulfill these requirements, as will be dem-
onstrated by the following analysis of the Baker criteria in the context
of the Occidental of Unm case. The Federal Constitution does not
relegate this area to any other branch; indeed, as was stated by Chief
Justice Marshall, "it is, emphatically, the province and the duty of
the judicial department, to say what the law is." 100 Nor is the court
precluded from issuing the relief sought. Nevertheless, the court felt
the case could not be resolved without a determination of "the
sovereign ownership of the portion of the continental shelf from
which the oil was extracted. Although sovereigns are not directly in-
volved, a judicial pronouncement on the sovereignty of Iran or Shar-
jah would be unavoidable." 10 1
96. 369 US. 186 (1962).
97. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d at 1203.
98. Id. at 211.
99. Id. at 217.
100. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
101. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d at 1203.
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Despite the court's strong reliance on this argument as a basis for
nonjusticiability, the inquiry is superfluous to this action because of
the nature of the relief requested. Occidental is not suing for a return
of the converted drilling site; rather, Occidental is seeking damages
to compensate for the time, money, and effort it expended in the
exploration and commencement of proceedings to extract the oil.
There is no need for an American court to resolve the question of
ownership of the continental shelf in 1978, because the alleged con-
version occurrred in 1969, and in accordance with the treaty govern-
ing the situation at that time, Occidental had a vested property right
in its lease with Umm. In addition, the potential for upsetting foreign
sovereign powers would not be present should the court order one
American corporation to share its profits with another American cor-
poration. The court is not asked to take the concession away from
Buttes and replace its services with those of Occidental; the re-
quested relief thus does not necessitate a policy determination of
"non-judicial discretion." 102 Further, a decision of this nature would
not be disrespectful to any coordinate branch of government, because
it is the judicial function to adjudicate "all cases, in law and equity,
arising under this constitution, [and] the laws of the United
States." 103 The abdication of judicial responsibility exhibited by this
court is unwise precedent for the future. American corporations
should not be allowed to induce a foreign sovereign to take action
which would be contrary to American law if performed directly by
the corporations. Not only does this establish an unstable foundation
for American investments and businesses abroad, but it weakens the
general efficaciousness of American law.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Dunhill, articulated
the view that it is the province of the Court to "decide for itself
whether deference to the political branches of government requires
abstention." 104 This would appear to be the sentiment of a majority
of the Court, as six justices did reject the "Bernstein exception" in
the Citibank case. '0 5 One distinguished commentator has gone so far
as to suggest that the entire Court has rejected the "Bernstein excep-
tion." 106 Oblivious to this Supreme Court pronouncement, the Oc-
cidental court placed undue reliance on a State Department letter
which calls for judicial abstention. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
102. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
103. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
104. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 715 (Powell, J., concurring).
105. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
106. 1975 Supreme Court Term, supra note 46, at 269 n.21.
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citing the 1954 Bernstein case inaccurately, declared it was "clear that
whether the state department believes that judicial action would in-
terfere with its foreign relations is germane to whether a court may
decide actions involving foreign relations." 107 This extra-judicial
determination violates the separation of powers of the three
branches because it results in the State Department (as a subdivision
of the executive branch) dictating to the judiciary what cases they
should hear or abstain from hearing. This appellate holding not only
violates the separation of powers doctrine, it also fails to correspond
to the factual situation of the instant case-a conversion action be-
tween two domestic corporations, with U.S. law applicable to U.S.
nationals. 108
Another element of the Baker test is absent in Occidental v. A
Certain Cargo, as there is no emergency situation which would re-
quire unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made.
Finally, enforcement of American tort law will not cause embarrass-
ment domestically or abroad. Thus, this court "cannot reject as 'no
lawsuit' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denomi-
nated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority," 109
The multi-pronged test of Baker has been criticized as being
"imprecise" and "vague":
[The] supposed guideposts do not clarify what a political question
is or how a court should test a controversy for political question
elements. Instead, they serve as useful tools of expediency for
judges to exploit once they have determined on other unarticulated
grounds that they do not want to decide the merits of the con-
troversy. 110
The validity of this criticism is borne out by the Occidental opinion.
Taking every tenet of the Baker test into consideration, one could
easily conclude that the Occidental controversy did not present a
bona fide political question. Shorn of all unnecessary facts, the instant
case presents a conversion claim for damages brought by one private
107. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d at 1204 n.1
4 .
108. This claim is one involving two American citizens. The State Department in
this situation should defer to the court's legal opinion, and actively support obedience
by American citizens to American law, whether situated within the United States or
abroad. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE L. J. 517, 577 (1966).
109. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
110. Jackson, The Political Question Doctrine: Where Does It Stand After Powell
v. McCormack, O'Brien v. Brown, and Gilligan v. Morgan, 44 U. COLO. L. REV.
477, 505 (1973).
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party against another. The peripheral issues of territorial waters and
boundaries are extraneous to the basic question which remains: can
the appellant show "that at the time of the conversion (1969) it was
entitled to possession of the res?" "I Occidental should be given the
opportunity to prove its case.
112
The political question doctrine is a judicial technique of
avoidance-most legitimate where there is a clear textual commit-
ment to another branch, or where the governing substantive law is in
a state of flux:
Political society survives and grows in the tension between princi-
ple and expediency, and even though it may be firmly committed
to the rule of principle, there must be room for the temporary
compromise and the "expedient muddling through." A court that
would unconditionally enforce absolute principle would destroy this
dynamic balance. But at the same time, the court could not legiti-
mate necessary but unprincipled political decisions, or imperfect
approximations of principle, without violating its own "raison
d'etre."
In the face of this dilemma, the court should be able to escape
from the alternative between validation and invalidation .... 113
Yet where the court possesses all the requisite elements necessary to
render a decision, it should not abdicate its responsibility to provide
the plaintiff with a forum in which to bring his suit. It is this respon-
sibility which the Occidental court shirked by straying into the pitfall
of the political question doctrine "which can easily be misunderstood
as drawing the line between law and politics." 114
One factor the court considered in its finding of non-justiciability
was the proper extent of a nation's territorial sea. Although this issue
was not necessary to a determination of the suit, the court, by refus-
ing to litigate the point, aided the faction which demands a twelve-
111. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d at 1202 n.10.
112. See Judge Van Graafeiland's dissent in Hunt v. Mobil Oil, 550 F.2d at 81.
[D]omestic corporations play a variety of roles in the affairs of foreign na-
tions, some of which may be forbidden under our laws. Where, as here,
the wrong complained of is the role played rather than the possible politi-
cal reaction thereto, I think it wrong to predicate an act of state [or politi-
cal question] defense upon the face of the pleadings. A complaint "should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief." Id.
113. Scharpf, supra note 108, at 534.
114. Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense
Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 473 (1976).
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mile territorial sea. By finding a political question, the court in reality
"perpetuat[es] the supposed lack of consensus so damaging to cus-
tomary international law. Its decision creates expectations throughout
the world, expectations which unfortunately will work in many areas
to undercut the international standard." 115
In addition, the court mistakenly stated that there were no man-
ageable standards to be applied and that it would be "in a judicial
no-man's land [should it] purport to decide the legality of Sharjah's
unilateral extension of its territorial waters or Iran's twelve mile
limit.""' The standards to be applied by the court should be those
established by the executive branch. As pointed out by the appel-
lants, "when Sharjah purported to extend its territorial sea to twelve
miles around Abu Musa in 1970, the United States proclaimed that it
'reserves its rights and those of its nationals in all areas . . . seaward
of the traditional three mile limit."' 117 Supplementing this executive
stance is the fact that the treaty which established Umm's continental
shelf in 1964 was created under British supervision, pursuant to the
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.118 The United States is a
party to this treaty, 119 thus allowing the court to employ the treaty
guidelines as a standard for deciding the case. The appellants,
moreover, pointed out that the appellee, Buttes,
for the first time on appeal raised the novel contention that the
tiny island of Abu Musa possesses a continental shelf of its own
expanding beyond the limits of its territorial waters. But neither
Iran nor Sharjah has ever claimed an independent continental shelf
for Abu Musa. Buttes lacks the standing and capacity to assert
sovereign rights unclaimed by the sovereigns themselves. 120
Through the utilization of the political question doctrine, the
Court purported to exhibit both an understanding of its own institu-
tional limitations, and the proper respect for the sphere of power
reserved to another branch. In reality, however, it is only creating a
"decisional vacuum, in which the claims of the parties can never be
115. Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Or-
der, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 33 (1970).
116. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d at 1205.
117. Petitioner's Brief For Certiorari at 15, Occidental v. A Certain Cargo, No.
78-910, U. S. (1978).
118. Convention on the Continental Shelf of April 29, 1958, 15 U.ST. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312.
119. Id.
120. Petitioner's Brief For Certiorari at 17-18 n.8, Occidental v. A Certain Cargo,
No. 78-910, U.S. (1978).
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adjudicated, regardless of merit." 121 The facts of Occidental of Umm
al Qaywayn v. A Certain Cargo do not necessitate a finding of politi-
cal question as decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. That
outcome was reached through the Court's self-limitation theory which
allows it to avoid adjudicating a difficult case.
The use of the political question doctrine, in cases involving in-
ternational disputes, must be confined in much the same manner as
has occurred with the defenses of sovereign immunity and act of
state. The legitimate use of any of these doctrines occurs only where
the nature of the action involved is truly sovereign. The opportunity
to clarify and define the appropriate uses of the act of state and politi-
cal question doctrines was handed to the Supreme Court when Occi-
dental filed its petition for a writ of certiorari on December 6,
1978.122 It is time for the Supreme Court, and for courts of the
future, to refuse to be overawed by international complexities and to
instead focus judicial attention on existing disputes between American
parties.
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